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METROMEDIA, INC. v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO:
MUNICIPAL BILLBOARD REGULATION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Municipalities regulate commercial speech, 1 particularly signs and
billboards,' as a means of confronting aesthetic, traffic safety, and
other local problems.' Historically, municipal billboard regulations
1. The Supreme Court generally refers to commercial speech as "expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 497 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). See also
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 363-64 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). See general J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N.
YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 767 (1978) ("speech of any form that
advertises a product or service for profit or for business purpose.")
2. Most courts examine billboard regulations under the commercial speech doc-
trine. One commentator has suggested that such a categorization confuses the me-
dium with the type of message being conveyed. See Comment, Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and the Realities ofBillboard Con-
trol, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 295, 316-18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Billboard Control].
Courts have not mechanically cast all sign control legislation, however, under the
auspices of the commercial speech doctrine. See State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 A.2d
821 (1980), in which the court noted that the defendant's "public interest" sign consti-
tuted "political speech and occupies a preferred position in our system of constitution-
ally protected interests." 416 A.2d at 826 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115 (1943)). See also John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, No. 79-1575 (1st Cir.
Dec. 22, 1980) (implication that the Maine billboard ban would be constitutional had
it applied to commercial speech only); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977).
3. Historically, cities attempted to use their zoning powers (see note 17 infra) to
protect the appearance of the community. See, e.g., State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50
Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 325 (1967); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Pub.
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E.2d 799 (1935), appeal dismissed sub nom., General
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Callahan, 297 U.S. 725 (1936); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19
N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1967). Early cases held that aesthetic
considerations were insufficient to justify billboard regulations. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905); Kansas City
Gunning Advertising Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, 144 S.W. 1099 (1912); State v.
Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908). See also 1 R. ANDERSON AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 7.16 (2d ed. 1976). Although courts gradually accepted aesthetics
as a zoning consideration, additional justifications were required to support billboard
regulations. See Neff v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 280, 43 N.E.2d 947, 950
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(1942); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929
(1911). See also Cumberland v. Eastern Federal Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 269 S.E.2d
672 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (aesthetic considerations are legitimate governmental con-
cerns yet an ordinance may not be based solely upon them), petition denied, 273
S.E.2d 453 (1980). Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 255
Cal. App. 2d 765, 769, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1967) (county zoning ordinance may be
based on aesthetic considerations if there is some other justification, such as economic
advantage). See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.13, at 559; E. MCQUILLAN
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.19 (3d ed. 1976); Note, On the YThreshold ofa Taking
Limits on Municipal Exclusion of Billboards, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 123 (1976). The
current majority position requires both an aesthetic and a separate non-aesthetic justi-
fication to support a billboard regulation. Id. See also Holme, Billboards and On-
Promise Signs: Regulation and Elimination under the Fifth Amendment, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN, 247, 267
(1974). A growing number of courts, however, recognize aesthetics as an indepen-
dently sufficient ground to justify police power (see note 17 infra) regulation. See,
e.g., Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 S.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); John Donnelly & Sons
v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 218, 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (1975); Opinion
of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762, 764 (1961); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v.
Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 539, 324 A.2d 113, 119 (1974). See also Billboard Con-
trol, supra note 2, at 309-11. Further, a growing number of commentators argue that
aesthetics alone may be sufficient for regulation. See, e.g., Norton, Police Power,
Planning, andAestheties, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW 171 (1967); Sutton, Billboard Regula-
ions and.4esthetics, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 194 (1972); Williams, Subjectivity, Expres-
sion and Privacy: Problems ofAesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note,
Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438
(1973); Note, Municoal Corporations: Sign Control Through Municipal Zoning Ordi-
nances, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 735 (1974); Note, Outdoor Sign Regulation in Eden and
Wisconsin, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 153 (1972).
Courts have also permitted billboard regulations under a traffic safety rationale.
See, e.g., E. B. Elliot Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141,
1152 (5th Cir. 1970); Lindsey v. Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352, 507 S.W.2d 101 (1974);
Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 68-70, 30 A.2d 527, 529-30 (1943) (upholding a
statute banning offsite billboards within 300 feet of highway intersections and 240 feet
from the center of any roadway under a "right to see and be seen" rationale). See
generally I ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.09, at 548; Fonoroff & Terrill, Controlling
Traffic Through Zoning, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 857 (1970). The traffic-safety rationale
suggests that billboards obstruct a driver's view of cross traffic at intersections. E.g.,
Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, supra note 3, at 70, 30 A.2d at 530. Traffic safety arguments
point out that the goal of billboard advertising is to divert the motorist's attention
from the road to the message. Id Some commentators contend, however, that studies
fail to substantiate a correlation between billboards and automobile accidents. See,
e.g., Moore, Regulation of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Purposes, 8 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 191, 197 (1963); Sutton, Billboard Regulations andAesthetics, 21 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 194, 200 (1972). In fact, one commentator has suggested that billboards improve
highway safety by reducing "highway hypnosis." Dowds, Private Signs and Public
Interests, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 231 (1974).
Municipalities have traditionally used their zoning powers (see note 17 infra) to
regulate a variety of local problems. See Note, The Effect of First Amendment Protec-
tion of Commercial Speech on Municr#al Sign Ordinances, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 941,
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withstood first amendment4 challenges5 due to the judicially formu-
942 (1978) (listing prevention of safety hazards, control of obscenity, and protection
of the aesthetic environment) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commercial Speech]. See
generally I ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 7.01-.33 (discussing, in great detail, legitimate
objections of zoning); Sofaer, Recent Developments in Local Government Law, 7 URB.
LAW. 1, 14 (1975) (discussing municipal control of obscenity); Note, Colorado Munici-
pal Government Authority to Regulate Obscene Materials, 51 DEN. L.J. (1974); Com-
ment, Control of Panic Selling by Regulation of "For Sale" Signs, 10 URBAN L. ANN.
323 (1975) (discussing the problem of "white ffight" and closely related problem of
"blockbusting.")
4. The first amendment states unequivocally that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme
Court, however, has consistently held that some regulation of speech is necessary.
E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961) (rejecting the
view that freedom of speech and association under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments are absolute in both scope and protection); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88
(1949). See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 47-63 (1967); Hunter, Prescription Drugs and Open Housing: More on
Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY L.J. 815, 818 (1976). In Kovacs, the Court declared
that "[T]he preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty
for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and
convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would
be harsh and arbitrary in itself." 336 U.S. at 88.
Historically, the Court consistently limits the scope of constitutionally protected
speech in at least two ways. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. at 49-50.
First, the context or form of the expression may render it constitutionally unprotected.
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not within the area
of protected speech and press); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (advocacy
of forcible overthrow of the government in the context of teaching an abstract princi-
ple is not prohibited by the Smith Act). Secondly, regulatory statutes not intended to
control the content of expression though limiting its exercise may remove speech from
constitutional protection if supported by a valid governmental interest. See, e.g.,
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solici-
tation did not violate first amendment); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)
(upholding state statute which prohibited a parade or procession on a public street
without a special license). The Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
indicated that first amendment freedoms may be constitutionally abridged if the gov-
ernmental regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest and
"if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id at 377.
5. First amendment attacks are notably absent in challenges to municipal sign
ordinances decided prior to Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 798 (1976), and after Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). See, e.g., DeKalb Real Estate Board, Inc. v. Commissioners of Roads and
Revenues, 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973). In Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary,
491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), a sign ordinance withstood a first amendment challenge
because of the commercial speech exception. See note 6 infra, See also Commercial
Speech, supra note 3, at 942 n.3 (1978).
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lated commercial speech exception.' Courts have only recently be-
gun to afford commercial speech limited7 first amendment
protection In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,9 however, a
divided 0 Supreme Court invalidated a municipal billboard-control
ordinance11 on first amendment grounds while noting that the ordi-
nance permissibly regulated commercial speech.2
Appellants, two outdoor advertising corporations, 13 sought to en-
6. The Supreme Court announced the commercial speech exception in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 82 (1942). See note 33 and accompanying text in/ra. For
thoughtful discussions of the first amendment commercial speech exception, see Far-
ber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1979);
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values
of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 429, 448-58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Free Expression]; Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1965); Billboard Control, supra note 2, at 315-33; Comment, First
Amendment Protectionfor CommercialAdpertlsing: The New Constitutional Doctrine,
44 U. CHI. L. Rv. 205 (1976).
7. The Supreme Court affords commercial speech less protection under the first
amendment than noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). See Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). See generally notes 39-
84, 112-120 and accompanying text infra.
8. The seminal case of Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), extended limited
first amendment protection to purely commercial speech. This comment will sketch
the development of the commercial speech doctrine, its requirements, and their appli-
cations. See notes 39-84 and accompanying text infra.
9. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
10. Justice White wrote for the plurality. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell
joined Justice White's opinion. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment of the
plurality and filed an opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens con-
curred in parts I-IV of the plurality opinion, yet dissented with opinion from parts V-
VII and the judgment. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed dissent-
ing opinions. Id
11. SAN DIEGo, CAL., CODE § 101.0700 (1972).
12. The plurality invalidated the ordinance because it impermissibly infringed
upon noncommercial speech under the first amendment. 453 U.S. at 521. For a dis-
cussion of the plurality's rationale, see notes 88-95 infra.
13. Each of the appellants were owners of a substantial number of outdoor adver-
tsing displays (approximately 500 to 800) in the City of San Diego. Brief for Appel-
lant app. H-Joint Stipulation of Facts at 119, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490 (1981). Metromedia, Inc. and Pacific Outdoor Advertising brought suit
separately and were consolidated by stipulation at the Superior Court of San Diego
County. Id at 81a.
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join enforcement of a San Diego zoning ordinance14 prohibiting most
outdoor advertising displays. 5 Appellants argued that the ordinance
14. Id at 18-33. The San Diego Ordinance's declared purposes were traffic
safety, aesthetics, and public health, safety, and welfare. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE
§ 101.0700(A). Further, the ordinance provides that 'it is the purpose of these regula-
tions to eliminate. . . displays which do not relate to the premises on which they are
located (and) ... to ensure that signing is used as identification and not as advertise-
ment ... ." Id
The general prohibition of the ordinance bans off-site outdoor advertising display
signs. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(B) (1972). The ordinance specified that
the following were prohibited:
1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on the
premises.
2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manufac-
tured on the premises.
3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to a product, serv-
ice or activity, event, person, institution or business which may or may not be
identified by a brand name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold,
manufactured, produced or offered elsewhere than on the premises where such
sign is located.
Id For a discussion of the 'on site' and 'off site' categories in the ordinance, see note
93, 95 infra.
The ordinance in Metromedia did not prohibit outdoor advertising display signs
"which are either signs designating the name of the owner or occupant of the premises
upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising
goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which
such signs are placed .. " SAN DIEGO, CAL. CODE § 101.0700(B) (1972). The ordi-
nance specifically exempts twelve types of signs: government signs, bench signs, signs
manufactured or stored within the city limits, commemorative plaques, religious sym-
bols, signs within shopping centers not visible beyond the premises, real estate signs,
public service signs depicting time, temperature or news, signs on city regulated vehi-
cles, signs on licensed commercial vehicles, temporary off-premise subdivision direc-
tional signs, and temporary political campaign signs. Id § 101.0700(F).
15. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(B) (1972). The California Supreme
Court defined "outdoor advertising display sign" as a "rigidly assembled sign, dis-
play, or device permanently affixed to the ground or permanently attached to a build-
ing or other inherently permanent structure constituting or used for the display of, a
commercial or other advertising to the public .. " Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856 n.2, 610 P.2d 407, 411 n.2, 164. Cal. Rptr. 510, 513 n.2
(1980). The ordinance failed to define "outdoor advertising display sign." The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court adopted this 'narrow' definition to avoid any potential over-
breadth problems. See id
The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the rule that constitutional interests are
personal and may not be asserted vicariously. The theory posits that an unnecessarily
broad statute restricts or 'chills' protected speech by parties not before the court and
thereby escapes judicial review. The overbreadth doctrine "permits the invalidation
of regulations on First Amendment grounds even when the litigant challenging the
regulation has engaged in no constitutionally protected activity." Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1980). See also
1982]
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unconstitutionally abridged their first amendment rights. 6 San Di-
ego defended the ordinance as a valid police power 17 regulation
designed to advance municipal aesthetics and traffic safety.'8  The
trial court declared the ordinance unconstitutional under the first
amendment.19 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 852-58
(1970).
16. See Brief for Appellant at 18-33.
17. See Brief for Appellee at 7-19. Municipal Authority over land use, such as
outdoor advertising displays, is derived from the state police power.
Under the tenth amendment, "The states retain all powers not delegated to the
United States. . .nor prohibited. . . by the constitution." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), acknowl-
edged the "immense mass" of legislative powers that a state has over its "purely inter-
nal affairs, whether of trading or police. . . ." Id at 203, 210-11. Ten years later, in
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 102 (1837), the Court upheld New
York's authority to compel shipmasters to supply it with passenger lists. The Court
held that "the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of police;. . . a power which
rightfully belonged to the states." Id at 131. Chief Justice Taney observed in The
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), that the police power is "nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions." Id at 583. The modem understanding of the police power, first articu-
lated in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), is that a state may "prescribe regula-
tions to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources, and
add to its wealth and prosperity." Id at 31.
The police power is delegated to municipalities by enabling statutes or by home
rule provisions in the state's constitution. The California Constitution expressly
grants municipalities the power to make and enforce all local health, policy, sanitary
and other ordinances and regulations not in conffict with general laws. CAL. CONST.
art. XI, § 7.
18. 453 U.S. at 493. See note 17 supra. For a discussion of aesthetics and traffic
safety as police power objectives, see note 3 supra.
19. Id at 2884. The Superior Court also held that the ordinance was an unconsti-
tutional exercise of the city's police power. Brief for Appellant app. D at 89a-97a.
After filing separate motions for summary judgment, the parties submitted a stipu-
lation of facts. Those of notable interest are:
2. If enforced as written, Ordinance No. 10795 will eliminate the outdoor
advertising business in the city of San Diego.
20. All of the signs owned by plaintiffs in the City of San Diego are located at
areas zoned for commercial and industrial purposes.
28. Outdoor advertising increases the sales of products and produces numer-
ous direct and indirect benefits to the public. Valuable commercial, political and
social information is communicated to the public through the use of outdoor
advertising. Many businesses and politicians and other persons rely upon out-
door advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropri-
ate and prohibitively expensive.
Brief for Appellant, app H at 119a. One commentator has suggested that the city may
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sion, but found it unnecessary to address the first amendment issue.20
The California Supreme Court reversed,21 specifically rejecting the
first amendment challenge.22 A plurality of the United States
have stipulated away its best argument--that the ordinance represented more than a
time, place, and manner regulation and that adequate alternative forms of communi-
cation still remained. Note, City- Wide Prohibition of Billboards: Police Power and the
Freedom ofSpeech, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1597, 1599 n.9 (1979). For a discussion of time,
place, and manner restrictions see note 60 and accompanying text infra.
20. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 67 Cal. App. 3d 84, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453
(1977). The Superior Court granted the appellant's motion for summary judgment.
See Brief for Appellants app D at 89a-97a. The Court of Appeal opinion was not
published in the official reports because the California Supreme Court granted a hear-
ing. CAL. RULE OF COURT 976(d) (Deering 1980). The Court of Appeal held that the
ordinance violated the due process clause, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 67
Cal. App. 3d at 84, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 460 ("to broad, too general, and too inclusive");
that the municipality did not have the power to eliminate a lawful business unless it is
a nuisance, id, that the ordinance conflicts with the general laws, id (see, Outdoor
Advertising Act, CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 5226(b) (Deering 1976)) (billboards
"should be allowed to exist in business areas, subject to reasonable controls in the
public interest"); and that the city's goals could be accomplished with "more reason-
able and less drastic measures." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 67 Cal. App.
3d at 84, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
21. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1980). An opinion of the California Supreme Court initially issued on
March 21, 1979, was reported at 23 Cal. 3d 762, 592 P.2d 728, 154 Cal. Rptr. 212
(1979). A petition for rehearing was granted on May 23, 1979 thereby vacating the
earlier opinion.
22. The California Supreme Court sustained the ordinance as a valid municipal
police power regulation. The court held as a matter of law that billboards reasonably
relate to traffic safety. 26 Cal. 3d at 859, 610 P.2d at 412, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
Further, the court held that aesthetics is a valid municipal police power purpose. Id
at 860, 610 P.2d at 412, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 515. The court overruled a 70-year-old case,
Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 3d 318, 100 P. 867 (1909), which had invali-
dated a city-wide billboard prohibition on the ground that aesthetic considerations
alone could not justify the municipal police power exertion, to reach the result. Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d at 860-65, 610 P.2d at 413-15, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 5 16-19 (1980).
In rejecting the first amendment challenge, the court relied on three summary dis-
missals of appeal by the United States Supreme Court. Id at 867, 610 P.2d at 417, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 520. The Court considers summary dismissals and affirmances as dispo-
sitions on the merits, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), even though they
are of 'less' precedential value than an opinion on the merits.
The state court cases upholding billboard-prohibition ordinances against first
amendment challenges relied on by the California Supreme Court are: State v. Lotze,
92 Wash. 2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed sub nom Lotze v. Washington, 444
U.S. 921 (1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d
483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978).
The California Supreme Court found these three summary dismissals of appeals by
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Supreme Court reversed,23 invalidating the ordinance as an unconsti-
tutional restriction on noncommercial speech.24 The Court noted,
however, that the ordinance had permissibly regulated commercial
expression.25
In a society ever vigilant in safeguarding political liberty, freedom
of speech characteristically enjoys a preferred position among funda-
mental civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution.26 Courts thus sub-
ject regulation of first amendment interests to a more exacting
standard of judicial review. While the language of the freedom of
speech clause does not distinguish diverse forms of expression,2 8
courts regularly differentiate commercial from noncommercial
the United States Supreme Court dispositive of the first amendment issue. The court,
therefore, confined most of its free speech infringement analysis to the free speech
clause of the California Constitution. 26 Cal. 3d at 867-71, 610 P.2d at 416-20, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 519-23. The free speech clause of the California Constitution appears in
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (Deering Supp. 1981).
Justice Clark dissented from the majority's holding on the first amendment issue.
He argued that the majority should not have confined its analysis of the ordinance to
the limited protection afforded commercial speech because billboards carry both com-
mercial and noncommercial messages. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 888-90, 610 P.2d 407, 430-31,
164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 533-34 (1980) (Clark, J., dissenting). He rejected the majority's
conclusion that there were adequate alternative means to communicate protected
speech. Id at 895-96, 610 P.2d at 435-36, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39. Justice Clark
asserted that protected expression may not be totally prohibited simply because it is
obtrusive. Id at 892, 610 P.2d at 433, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 536. He concluded that the
"absoluteprohibiion" of off-site signs did not advance either traffic safety or aesthet-
ics. Id at 894, 610 P.2d at 434, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (emphasis in original).
Justices Newman and Richardson concurred in the judgment yet expressed some
discontentment with the majority's first amendment analysis. Justice Newman was
concerned with the scope of the ordinance, but believed the potential overbreadth
problem was solvable. Id at 887-88, 610 P.2d at 430, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 533 (Newman,
J., concurring). Justice Richardson shared Justice Clark's doubts but felt constrained
by the summary dismissals. -d at 886, 610 P.2d at 429, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 532 (Rich-
ardson, J., concurring).
23. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
24. Id at 521. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
25. Id at 503-12.
26. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 527 n.12 (1944); State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416 A.2d 821 (1980).
27. See Brief for Appellant at 35 (a state's exercise of the police power must with-
stand a more exacting review where constitutional values are at issue). A more exact-
ing review is required when First Amendment associational freedoms are implicated.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Similarly, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), requires a more exacting scrutiny when religious freedoms are implicated
by a regulation.
28. U.S. CONST. amend I. See note 4 supra.
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speech.29 Courts have traditionally reviewed billboard regulations as
restrictions on commercial speech.3" The degree of protection courts
have afforded commercial speech, however, has varied over the
years.31 Furthermore, courts have traditionally failed to justify the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, and the
resulting application of different standards of review.32
Initially, the Supreme Court refused to extend first amendment
protection to commercial expression. In Valentine v. Chrestensen , 3
the Court rejected a first amendment challenge to a municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting commercial leafletting.34 The Court established
the commercial speech exception,35 holding that the first amendment
does not protect speech which does nothing more than propose a
commercial transaction.36 Critics charge that the Chrestensen Court
failed to give a reasoned justification for denying commercial speech
29. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (there are common sense differences between commercial
and noncommercial speech). See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 578 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
30. See note 2 supra. The notion of a common sense distinction between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech, originally suggested in Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24, was offered only
for the limited purpose of explaining the inapplicability of the overbreadth doctrine to
commercial messages, id, and to justify greater flexibility in time, place, and manner
restrictions. Id See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 578 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
31. See notes 33-84 and accompanying text infra.
32. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 770-73 (1978). See generally note 120 infra (suggesting that commercial
expression serves the same first amendment values protected in noncommercial
speech).
33. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
34. Id at 54-55. Mr. Chrestensen distributed a leaflet which advertised a com-
mercial submarine exhibition on one side and a protest against the City Dock Depart-
ment on the other. Justice Roberts rejected the contention that the protest withdrew
the leaflet from the prohibition because the leaflet's purpose remained commercial
since the Dock protest was added to evade the commercial leafletting prohibition. Id
at 55. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L.
REv. 372, 376 (1979).
35. 316 U.S. at 54 (First amendment imposes no restraint on government as re-
spects commercial speech).
36. Id The Chrestensen court focused on the purpose of the expression to deter-
mine its commercial nature. Id at 54-55.
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first amendment protection.37 Nevertheless, courts and commenta-
tors have long read Chrestensen as excluding commercial speech
from any first amendment protection.38
The Court began to withdraw from the commercial speech doc-
trine of Chrestensen over thirty years later in Bigelow v. Virginia. In
Bigelow, a Virginia newspaper violated a state statute 0 by publishing
an advertisement for a New York abortion referral service.41 The
Court characterized the leaflet in Chrestensen as a simple commercial
proposal distinguishable from the advertisement in Bigelow4" which
37. See note 6supra. In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), Justice
Douglas, a member of the Chrestensen majority, describes the decision as "casual,
almost offhand." Id at 514 (Douglas J., concurring).
Following Chrestensen, application of the commercial speech exception was unpre-
dictable. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court sus-
tained a first amendment defense in a libel suit even though the remarks were
contained in a paid political advertisement. The Court stressed the content of the
expression, rather than the purpose of the advertisement which Chrestensen had em-
phasized. Id at 266.
Similarly, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973), the Court again used a content standard for determining the com-
merciality of expression rather than the purpose standard of Chresiensen. Id at 384-
85. The Court upheld the Commission's ban on sex-designated column headings for
employment advertisements. Id The Court held that the advertisements were com-
mercial speech and therefore unprotected by the first amendment. Id at 385.
After applying the Chrestensen doctrine inconsistently for three decades, the Court
in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) disregarded the assumption that commer-
cial speech was unprotected by the first amendment. Id at 825. See notes 39-84 and
accompanying text infra. The Court overruled Chrestensen the following year. Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). For a discussion of Virginia Pharmacy Board, see notes 46-61 and accom-
panying text infra.
38. See notes 5, 6 supra.
39. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1974) (repealed by 1975 Va. Acts, chs, 14, 15,
§§ 18.1-1 to 18.1-429).
41. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court emphasized that Virginia attempted to regu-
late the advertisement of a New York service. Virginia's police powers, however,
cannot control abortions performed in New York. Id at 813-24, 827-28. Nor could
Virginia burden the right to travel by preventing its citizens from going to New York
for an abortion. Id at 824, 827. The Court indicated that the Virginia statute bur-
dened interstate commerce in newspapers and periodicals carrying the advertisement.
Id at 828-29. The Court also recognized that the advertisement did more than
merely propose a commercial transaction since it related to the constitutional interest
of abortion. Id at 822.
42. Id
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contained important information of public interest.4 3  The Court
adopted a balancing approach" to assess the regulation's constitu-
tionality and held that commercial advertising enjoys some degree of
first amendment protection.'
A year later, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 46 extended Bigelow47 by hold-
ing that the first amendment protects commercial messages
irrespective of their public importance or informational value.48 In
Virginia Pharmacy Board, a consumer group challenged a statute4 9
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices."
The Court stated that common-sense differences51 between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech justify different degrees of protection
for each. 2 The Court dismissed the Chrestensen approach as too
simplistic53 and attempted to balance, as it had in Bigelow,5 4 the con-
flicting state" and first amendment interests. 6 The Court concluded
43. Id Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented, criticizing the ma-
jority's distinguishing the Bigelow advertisement for first amendment purposes on the
basis of content. They argued that the advertisement's commercial character was not
altered by the minimal public interest and factual information it contained about
abortion referral services. They concluded that just as in Chrestensen, a "proposition
directed toward the exchange of services rather than the exchange of ideas retains its
commerciality even if it involves some expression of opinion. Id at 831-33 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
44. See id at 826 ("a court may not escape the task of assessing the first amend-
ment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by
the regulation .
45. See id
46. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
47, Id at 760.
48. Id at 765. The Virginia Pharmacy Board Court acknowledged that the subject
matter of the advertisement in Bigelow may have created "some fragment of hope for
the continuing validity of a 'commercial speech' exception.. . ." Id at 760. The
Court resolved any lingering ambiguity, however, holding that speech will not be
denied First Amendment protection simply because it is commercial. Id at 760-62.
49. VA. CODE § 54-524 (1974).
50. Id
51. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See generally notes 7, 28-31 supra.
52. Id
53. 425 U.S. at 759.
54, See note 44 supra.
55. The State of Virginia argued that the statute was designed to protect the pro-
fessional image of pharmacists and to prevent price competition which could damage
the quality of pharmaceutical services. 425 U.S. at 766-68.
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that the Virginia statute unconstitutionally infringed upon society's
interest in the free flow of commercial information.-7 For the first
time the Court firmly58 held that the first amendment protects purely
commercial speech.59 The Court added, however, that a state could
impose a proper time, place, and manner restriction6" on commercial
expression.6
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Townsh p of Willingboro ,62 the Court
significantly expanded the scope of protected commercial speech.63
Earlier courts had extended first amendment protection to commer-
cial expression arguably linked with important public issues64 --such
56. See id at 762-65 (the free flow of commercial information). The Court bal-
anced the First Amendment interests of pharmacists, consumers, and society against
the statute's justifications (see note 54 supra) and concluded that the regulation vio-
lated the First Amendment. See id at 766-70.
57. Id at 770.
58. See note 48 supra.
59. 425 U.S. at 762 (commercial expression does not lack "all protection"). For a
discussion on 'purely' commercial speech, see note 1 supra.
60. 425 U.S. at 771. The Court acknowledged the first amendment time, place,
and manner exception. A time, place and manner restriction is permissible if it is
content neutral, serves a significant governmental interest,and leaves open other alter-
native channels for communication. Id See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-44 (1980) (ban on inserts containing information
on controversial issues into monthly consumer bills by public utility held invalid);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ban on willful noisemaking, on
grounds adjacent to a school, which disturbs the school's ordinary operations, held
invalid); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (ban on demonstrations in or
near a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice held valid).
61. 425 U.S. at 771. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board indicated that al-
though the first amendment protects commercial speech, common sense differences
suggest a different degree of protection is necessary for it than other forms of speech.
Id at 771 n.24. The Court goes on to suggest reasons for the disparity of treatment.
Id Commercial speech is more easily verifiable. Id Commercial speech is more
durable since the profit motive reduces the possibility of its being chilled. 1d But see
note 120 infra.
62. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
63. Id at 92-97. The Linmark decision extended first amendment protection to
commercial expression unrelated to other important public issues. The Bigelow ad-
vertisement contained information about abortions. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Board decision invalidated a statute prohibiting advertisement of
prescription drug prices. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Linmark statute, however, merely
prohibited the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on residential property. 431
U.S. at 94. By invalidating the statute, the Linmark court broadened the definition of
protected commercial speech.
64. Id The Linmark holding-that an ordinance which impairs the flow of legiti-
mate commercial information is unconstitutional, id at 98-strengthened the Court's
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as abortion in Bigelow, and drug price competition in Virginia Phar-
macy Board. In Linmark, the Court invalidated a municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on
residential property.65 The city attempted to distinguish the Bigelow
and Virginia Pharmacy Board cases by arguing that the ordinance
only restricted one manner of communication.66 The Court recog-
nized, as it did in Virginia Pharmacy Board, that an ordinance regu-
lating only the time, place or manner6 7 of speech warrants a lesser
standard of review6" if alternate channels of communication are
position in Virginia Pharmacy Board. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Linmark, the Court
analyzed the nature of the restriction to determine whether it regulated on the basis of
content or factors unrelated to content. 431 U.S. at 92-94. A content-neutral ordi-
nance which incidentally affects speech while furthering a valid police power goal
does not regulate speech per se. See id Therefore, the first amendment is not impli-
cated. See id See also Commercial Speech, supra note 3, at 949-5 1. The ordinance
involved in Linmark regulated on the basis of content. 431 U.S. at 92-93. In Virginia
Pharmacy Board, the Court balanced the state interest supporting the content based
regulation against the infringement on individual freedom. 425 U.S. at 766-69. The
Linmark court did not, however, undertake a balancing test. 431 U.S. at 92-94.
Linmark suggests that even with a compelling state interest, an ordinance which re-
stricts the flow of legitimate commercial information is invalid. Id at 95. Important
state interests remain a factor, however, in "time, place, and manner" cases. Id at 93-
94.
The Linmark implication--that content based regulations are unconstitutional re-
gardless of the state interests involved, 431 U.S. at 95-has not been developed by the
Court. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530, 537-
38, n.5 (1980) (listing numerous 'narrow exceptions' to the first amendment's hostility
to subject matter distinctions-notably, commercial speech). See also Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 561-63(1980) (con-
tent based restriction on commercial speech subjected to four-step analysis).
65. 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977). The governmental interest advanced by the city was
the promotion on "stable, racially integrated housing." Id at 94.
66. Id at 92-93. The township argued that because the ordinance only restricted
one means of communication, the regulation less directly implicated first amendment
concerns. The township attempted, therefore, to characterize the ordinance as a time,
place and manner restriction. The Court rejected this characterization because no
adequate alternatives were available, and because the ordinance regulated on the ba-
sis of content. Id at 94.
67. See note 60 supra.
68. 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (restriction that regulates only the time, place or
manner of speech may be imposed so long as reasonable). Cf., Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (regulation based on con-
tent must be scrutinized more carefully). See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolying Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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available.69 The Court determined, however, that the ordinance reg-
ulated legitimate commercial information on the basis of content70
and required, therefore, a strict standard of review. 7 1 After strictly
scrutinizing the ordinance,72 the Court held that the content-based
regulation, though supported by a significant municipal interest,73
unconstitutionally restricted the flow of legitimate commercial
information.74
The Court retreated from the Linmark strict scrutiny standard 71 to
an intermediate level of review for content-based regulations in Cen-
Iral Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission.76 In
CentralHudson, the Court invalidated on first amendment grounds77
a New York Public Service Commission regulation prohibiting ad-
vertising by the electric utilities.7" The Court established a four-step
69. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)
(must leave open ample alternative channels for communication). See note 60 supra.
The Linmark Court suggested that cost, degree of autonomy, and effectiveness are
factors in determining if there are "ample alternatives." 431 U.S. at 93.
70. Id at 93-94. Linmark does not suggest a test to determine whether an ordi-
nance places an undue restraint on content. See note 64 supra. A primary considera-
tion is the availability of "ample alternatives" for communication. See note 69 and
accompanying text supra. The Linmark Court held that the alternatives available-
word of mouth, real estate listings, newspaper advertisements-were insufficient. 431
U.S. at 92-94.
71. Id at 96-97. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 577 (1980) (Blackmun, I., concurring) ("The Court in
Linmark resolved beyond all doubt that a strict standard of review applies to suppres-
sion of commercial information.. . ."); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (regulation based on content must be scrutinized
more carefully).
72. The Court in Linmark focused on whether the ordinance regulated the con-
tent of the speech or was limited to noncontent oriented criteria. 431 U.S. 85, 92-93
(1977). See note 64 supra. One commentator suggests that an ordinance that regu-
lates the time, place, or manner of expression in an attempt to further a proper police
power objective presents-no First Amendment problem since there isn't any regula-
tion of speech. If the ordinance regulated based on content criteria, however, the first
amendment protection must be examined. See Note, Commercial Speech, supra note
3, at 949-50.
73. 431 U.S. 85, 94-96 (1977). The Linmark Court recognized the municipality's
substantial interest in promoting stable integrated housing. Id
74. Id at 98.
75. See notes 68-69, 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
76. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). But see id at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (objec-
tion to use of an intermediate level of review to scrutinize content-based regulation).
77. Id at 558-61.
78. See New York Public Service Commission, Statement of Policy on Advertis-
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analysis of content-based restrictions on commercial speech.79 First,
the advertisement must not contain unlawful or misleading informa-
tion so as to withdraw it from first amendment protection. 0 Second,
the state must assert a substantial governmental interest.81 If these
two criteria are met, the regulation must directly advance the asserted
interest 82 in a manner no more extensive than necessary. 3 Applying
this four-step test, the Court held that the advertising prohibition un-
necessarily restricted commercial speech and lacked a direct connec-
tion with the state's interest in energy conservation.8 a
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego ,85 a plurality of the Court
found that the municipal ordinance" met the Central Hudson re-
ing and Promotional Practices of Public Utilities, No. 27,052 (Feb. 25, 1977), citedin
94 HARV. L. REV. 159, 159 n.3 (1980).
79. 447 U.S. at 566. The Court indicated that the protection available for a com-
mercial expression turns on both the nature of the expression and the governmental
interests served by its regulation. Id at 563.
80. 447 U.S. at 563, 566 (1980). Similarly, previous courts held that misleading
commercial speech and commercial advertising related to unlawful activity are un-
protected by the first amendment. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (op-
tometrists may be prohibited from practicing under a trade name because it is likely
to mislead consumers); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (prohibits sexual classification of job advertisements be-
cause sex discrimination in employment is illegal).
81. 447 U.S. at 564, 566. The Court departed from its traditional approach to
content-based restrictions by requiring a substantial rather than a compelling state
interest. Id at 564. Justice Blackmun objected to this departure and the lesser pro-
tection afforded commercial speech under the Court's intermediate level of scrutiny.
447 U.S. at 575-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He argued that the Linmark Court
"resolved beyond all doubt" that a strict standard of review applies to content-based
restrictions of truthful commercial information. Id at 577 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977).
82. 447 U.S. at 564, 566 (1980). The Court derived the requirement that the regu-
lation directly advance the asserted substantial interest from Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which prohibited advertising
designed indirectly to protect ethical and performance standards of the pharmaceuti-
cal and legal professions, respectively. See 447 U.S. at 564.
83. Id at 565-66.
84. Id at 566-71. The Court noted that the banned advertisements were neither
unlawful nor misleading. The state interests in energy conservation and distribu-
tional rate fairness were substantial. The state interests were not, however, directly
advanced by the regulation. Further, the regulation was not narrowly drawn to
achieve these interests. Id
85. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
86. See notes 14-15 supra.
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quirements for commercial speech regulation. 7 Justice White, writ-
ing for the plurality, purported8 8 to scrutinize the content-based
regulation89 under the Central Hudson intermediate level of review.90
He found the advertising at issue neither misleading nor unlawful,
and the city's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics substantial. 91
Acknowledging an apparent incongruity, 92 Justice White neverthe-
less concluded the city could reasonably find that off-site commercial
billboards have a greater impact on traffic safety and aesthetics than
do on-site commercial billboards. 93 The plurality determined, there-
87. 453 U.S. at 512.
88. 453 U.S. at 503-21, 517 n.22 & n.24. Justice White criticized Chief Justice
Burger for adopting the lesser standard of review appropriate in time, place and man-
ner cases. 453 U.S. at 517-21, 517 n.22 & n.24. This criticism is, in fact, correct. See
notes 102-04 and accompanying text infra. Justice White also fails, however, to apply
the Central Hudson intermediate level of review properly. At several points in the
opinion, he finds that the "city could reasonably conclude," or that there is nothing to
suggest, that the legislative judgment on the effects of billboards on traffic safety was
"manifestly unreasonable." 453 U.S. at 508-12. Such statements demonstrate a mis-
understanding of the intermediate level of review and the Central Hudson test. Id. at
528 n.7, 534 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("hardly a sufficient finding under the
heightened scrutiny appropriate.. . . [B]ut Central Hudson demands more than a
rational basis. .... ).
89. Time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if they regulate without
reference to the content of the regulated speech. See note 60 and accompanying text
supra. Because the San Diego ordinance distinguishes between permissible and im-
permissible signs at a particular location by reference to their content, the plurality
appropriately refused to characterize the ordinance as a time, place and manner re-
striction. See 453 U.S. at 516-17 ("whether or not the distinctions are themselves
constitutional, they take the regulation out of the domain of time, place, and manner
restrictions").
90. Id 453 U.S. at 507-12, 517 n.22, n.23.
91. Id at 507-12.
92. Id at 511. See note 95 infra.
93. 453 U.S. at 511. Compare id at 511 with id at 534-36 and id at 534 n. 12. The
ordinance permits on-site advertising yet prohibits identical advertising off-site. See
note 14 supra. It is not intuitively apparent that this distinction in treatment of on-site
and off-site advertising displays directly advances either traffic safety or aesthetics.
Identical billboards located on the same property--one advertising goods manufac-
tured on the site, the other goods manufactured off the site-have the same impact on
traffic safety and aesthetics. It is not constitutionally sufficient under the Central Hud-
son intermediate level of review that Justice White finds the city could reasonably
conclude the ordinance directly advances traffic safety and aesthetics. See note 88
supra Central Hudson requires more than a merely rational fit between the govern-
mental interest asserted and the restrictive means chosen to effectuate that interest.
Justice White argued, however, that the otherwise valid prohibition of off-site com-
mercial billboards, was not less valid because on-site commercials were expected. 453
U.S. at 511. San Diego has made a policy choice, on-site commercial billboards over
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fore, that the ordinance was not more restrictive than was necessary
to directly advance the city's interests.94 The plurality invalidated the
ordinance, however, because it impermissibly restricted noncommer-
cial speech.95
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment,96 but expressed dissat-
isfaction with the limited protection afforded commercial speech.97
He criticized the plurality for deferentially accepting the city's finding
that a total prohibition of off-site commercial billboards directly ad-
vanced the interests of traffic safety and aesthetics.98 In particular, he
objected to the plurality's comments that the city could reasonably
conclude that off-site commercial billboards have a greater impact on
off-site commercial billboards. In a limited situation, then, the city's interests yield to
on-site commercial advertising. Id But see i at 534 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("under this view the city with merely a reasonable justification could pick and choose
between those it would and would not allow.").
94. Id at 511-12.
95. Id at 512-17. Justice White interpreted the on-site exception to the general
prohibition of the ordinance as limited solely to commercial speech. Id at 493-96.
But see id at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan does not interpret the
on-site exception as limited to commercial speech. He reads the ordinance to mean
that the permissible content of a sign within the on-site exception depends strictly on
the identity of the owner or occupant of the premises. Id Justice White finds no
similar on-site exception for noncommercial speech. Id at 513. He argues that non-
commercial on-site billboards have no greater impact on traffic safety and aesthetics
than do commercial on-site billboards. Id at 513-15. Justice White advances the
same argument, therefore, that he rejected earlier in the commercial on-site/off-site
exception issue. See note 93 supra. Justice White indicates that commercial speech
cases have given noncommercial speech greater first amendment protection than com-
mercial speech. 453 U.S. at 513. Thus, the ordinance inverts this position. Id He
concludes, therefore, that "insofar as the ordinance tolerates billboards, it cannot
choose to limit their content to commercial messages." Id at 513.
Justice White also indicates that the ordinance improperly distinguishes between
permissible and impermissible noncommercial signs at a particular site by reference
to their content. Id at 516. He arrives at this conclusion by noting that the ordinance
contains exceptions to the noncommercial sign prohibition. Id at 514-15. But see id
at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (plurality trivializes genuine first amendment values
by basing holding on exceptions).
Finally, Justice White rejects the possibility that the ordinance can be characterized
as a time, place, and manner restriction. Id at 515-17. The ordinance does not gen-
erally ban billboards as an unacceptable manner. Those billboards that are banned
are banned everywhere; there are no alternative channels of communication. More-
over, the ordinance distinguishes on the basis of content. Id
96. Id at 521 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Id at 534-40 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. Id at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
traffic safety and aesthetics than on-site commercial billboards. 99
Justice Brennan persuasively noted that the apparent reasonableness
of a finding can hardly suffice under the heightened scrutiny appro-
priate for the case." °
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the judiciary possesses
no greater ability to determine whether the billboard prohibition ad-
vances aesthetics than the city.'' Chief Justice Burger agreed, argu-
ing in dissent that given a reasonable approach to a substantial
interest, the Court need only determine whether the city's approach is
essentially content-neutral, and that adequate alternative channels of
communication are available. 2 The Chief Justice, therefore, ana-
lyzed the case under an improper standard of review, 10 3 having mis-
taken the ordinance for a time, place, and manner restriction. 1' 4
Chief Justice Burger recognized, however, that the plurality leaves
cities with an unsatisfactory choice between total billboard prohibi-
tion or total acceptance of noncommercial billboards." 5
Justice Stevens, dissenting, 10 6 argued that the plurality invalidated
the ordinance because the regulation did not restrict enough
speech. 107 Hypothesizing that a total billboard prohibition is consti-
tutional under the plurality's analysis, 08 Justice Stevens suggested
99. Id at 528-29.
100. Id at 528 n.7, 534 n.12.
101. Id at 569-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Id at at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
103. See id at 517 n.23. Chief Justice Burger applied the lesser standard of scru-
tiny applicable in time, place and manner restrictions. See notes 60, 89 Supra; note
104 infra.
104. See 453 U.S. at 517 n.23. Clearly, the ordinance is not a time, place, and
manner restriction. See id Time, place and manner restrictions must serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest, leave open ample alternative means of communication,
and regulate without reference to the content of the regulated speech. E.g., Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-95 (1977); Virginia Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). The parties have by
stipulation removed the possibility of ample alternative channels of communication.
See 453 U.S. at 497 (quoting parties Joint Stipulation of Facts, no. 28). Also, the
ordinance distinguishes for the purposes of regulation on the basis of content. Id at
516-17. See note 89 supra.
105. 453 U.S. at 564 (Burger, J., dissenting).
106. Id at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id at 540 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. 453 U.S. at 541. See id at 515 n.20 ("Because a total prohibition of outdoor
advertising is not before us, we do not indicate whether such a ban would be consis-
tent with the first amendment"). Cf. id at at 536-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
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that it is difficult to understand why a less restrictive approach is in-
valid."° He concluded, as did the Chief Justice, ° that nothing in
the ordinance poses a serious threat to the first amendment. 1 '
The plurality in Metromedia misapplied the Central Hudson
test. 12 Justice Brennan accurately observed113 that Central Hudson
requires more than a rational nexus between the interests asserted
and the means chosen to effectuate those interests. 4 It is not consti-
tutionally satisfactory under an intermediate level of review that the
content-based distinctions underlying a commercial speech restric-
tion appear reasonable. 5 The first amendment, as interpreted by
Central Hudson, requires that content-based commercial speech re-
strictions directly advance substantial governmental interests in a
manner no more extensive than necessary." 16
Although Central Hudson clarified the degree of protection af-
forded commercial expression," 7 the Court in Metromedia failed to
recognize the need for further substantive reform of the commercial
speech doctrine. Each opinion in Metromedia acknowledged,11 as
did Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy Board, and Linmark, that commer-
cial speech is neither completely vulnerable to municipal restriction
judgment) (the plurality does not decide the constitutionality of a total ban yet sends a
signal to cities that bifurcated billboard regulations prohibiting commercial messages
but allowing noncommercial messages are constitutional); id at 570 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (an aesthetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of
billboards).
109. 453 U.S. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (since a wholly impartial ban on
billboards would be permissible, it is difficult to understand why a ban with excep-
tions poses a greater threat to the First Amendment).
110. Id at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id at 566 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
111. Id at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text supra.
113. 453 U.S. at 534 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980). See also note 93 supra.
115. 453 U.S. at 528, 534 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557, 564-65 (1980). See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978) (speech restrictions
must be narrowly drawn).
117. See 94 HARV. L. REy. 159, 168 (1981).
118. See 453 U.S. at 512-17; id at 534-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id at 563; (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joins
part I and IV of the plurality opinion); id at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (agreeing
substantially with the opinions expressed in C.J. Burger and J. Stevens dissents).
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nor protected to the extent of noncommercial expression.' 19 This un-
certainty as to the scope of protection that commercial speech enjoys
will remain so long as the Court fails to articulate the values served
by protecting commercial speech under the first amendment. 2
The Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego decision leaves munici-
palities facing local aesthetic and traffic safety problems without dis-
cernible guidance. Because the scope of protection for commercial
expression is uncertain, the commercial speech doctrine remains
vague. 121 Absent a meaningful articulation on the scope of first
amendment protection that commercial speech enjoys, the commer-
cial speech doctrine continues as an ad hoc balancing test defying
consistent application. 22 City planners attempting to regulate com-
mercial speech as a means of confronting local urban problems need
119. See generally notes 39-74 supra (discussing the Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy
Board, and Linmark decisions' extension of first amendment protection to commer-
cial speech); Billboard Control, supra note 2, at 326.
120. See Billboard Control, supra note 2, at 326-27. The first amendment protects
expression if it furthers identifiable first amendment values. Id The principal values
of the first amendment are the dissemination of ideas and information and individual
self-expression. See, e.g., Free Expression, supra note 6, at 472; Comment, Commer-
cial Speech and the Limits of Legal Advertising, 58 OR. L. Rv. 193, 194 (1979); 94
HARv. L. Rnv. 159, 165 (1981). Commercial expression serves the first amendment,
therefore, by enhancing the unrestricted flow of information. See, e.g., Free Expres-
sion, supra note 6, at 432-34, 443-48; 94 HA v. L. Rnv. 159, 165 (1980-81). But see
Baker, Commercial Speeck- A Problem in the Theory ofFreedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1,
3 (1976) (arguing that the first amendment is principally designed to protect self-ex-
pression and that commercial speech does not further this goal). By increasing the
marketplace of information available to the public, commercial expression facilitates
the rational decisionmaking that aids private self-government. See, e.g., Free Expres-
sion, supra note 6, at 432-34, 441-43; 94 HARv. L. REv. 159, 165 (1981). Thus, com-
mercial expression serves the first amendment by aiding the private self-governing
function. See Free Expression, supra note 6, at 445. Finally, non-informational com-
mercial expression furthers the first amendment value of self-expression. See Free
Expression, supra note 6, at 446-47; 94 HI-Rv. L. REv. 159, 165 (1981) ("Even the
purest forms of commercial advertising manifest some artistic and individual expres-
sions of their creators"). But see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("what some have considered to be the principal
function of the first amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expres-
sion, self-realization, and self-fulfillment is not at all furthered by corporate speech
121. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Comment, Billboard Control, supra note 2, at 328 n.197.
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substantive reform of the commercial speech doctrine to aid their ef-
forts. The Metromedia Court failed to provide that reform.
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